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This Article contends that that there is a fundamental dynamic involved 
in the information privacy landscape that has heretofore remained largely un-
examined and has resulted in intractable problems in information privacy law 
and jurisprudence–namely, corporate power.  More specifically, this Article ar-
gues that information privacy is governed not just by governmental law but 
also by corporations via private governance.  Part I of this Article briefly can-
vasses the current state of information privacy law and jurisprudence.  Part II 
argues that domestic and international legal regimes are governed not only by 
governments but also by private actors, including corporations.  Part III pre-
sents three examples of corporations engaging in private governance of infor-
mation privacy.  Part IV addresses some of the implications of the private gov-
ernance model as applied to information privacy law. 
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“[T]hat which goes unrecognized is difficult to regulate.”1
 
INTRODUCTION 
Information privacy laws and jurisprudence are at an impasse.  
For the most part, scholars are engaged in well-meaning but intracta-
ble debates.2  The majority of the information privacy scholarship fo-
cuses on one of the following projects: defining or describing pri-
vacy;3 finding adequate metaphors for  privacy;4 locating, defending, 
or critiquing privacy law (beginning with Warren and Brandeis’s 
seminal article published in 1890, the Right to Privacy);5 locating par-
ticular privacy wrongs;6 or balancing privacy interests with other in-
terests such as national security.7  In addition, in response to the 
many problems of information privacy—problems such as computer 
profiling,8 personal data collection and sharing by companies,9 iden-
 1 A. Claire Cutler, Private International Regimes and Interfirm Cooperation, in THE 
EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 23, 24 (Rodney Bruce Hall 
& Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002). 
 2  
     Given the political history of the privacy debate in this country, no 
significant shift in U.S. policy seems likely to occur until some crisis or 
highly publicized event forces us to look at the issue from a new per-
spective.  Indeed, in the current political climate, efforts to press a 
fundamental shift in policy appear to be losing momentum. . . .  With-
out a sense of urgency, special interest politics and a general anti-
regulatory sentiment will likely dominate political discourse in the 
United States on this issue for the foreseeable future.
James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1, 
90–91 (2003). 
 3 See generally, ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Ruth Gavison, Pri-
vacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980); Tal Z. Zarsky, Thinking Outside the 
Box: Considering Transparency, Anonymity, and Pseudonymity as Overall Solutions to the 
Problems of Information Privacy in the Internet Society, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 991 (2004). 
 4 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for 
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (2001). 
 5 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193 (1890). 
 6 See generally, Joel Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS 
L.J. 877 (2003). 
 7 See generally, Sadiq Reza, Privacy and the Post-September 11 Immigration Detainees:  
The Wrong Way to a Right (and Other Wrongs), 34 CONN. L. REV. 1169 (2002). 
 8 See generally, Comment, Janet Dean Gertz, The Purloined Personality: Consumer 
Profiling in Financial Services, 39 San Diego L. Rev. 943 (2002). 
 9 See, e.g., DANIEL SOLOVE, MARC ROTENBERG & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION 
PRIVACY LAW  623–35 (2006). 
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tity theft,10 and problems of non-secure computer databases contain-
ing personal information11—privacy scholars have put forth a variety 
of possible solutions.  Some of these solutions are based in traditional 
bodies of law such as tort law,12 contract law,13 and property law.14  
Other solutions call for statutory reform in matters pertaining to data 
collection, sharing, and use.15  But the answers to the problems in in-
formation privacy have remained elusive. 
This Article contends that that there is a fundamental dynamic 
involved in the information privacy landscape that has heretofore 
remained largely unexamined and has resulted in intractable prob-
lems in information privacy—namely, corporate power.  More spe-
cifically, this Article argues that information privacy is governed not 
just by governmental law but also by corporations via private govern-
ance.  Unless corporate power vis-à-vis the individual and the govern-
ance of information privacy law by corporations is addressed, the law 
will continue to strengthen corporate power and erode privacy in the 
guise of privacy-enhancing efforts.  Scholars must delve beneath the 
façade of privacy laws and Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) en-
forcement actions in order to expose the power dynamics that per-
vade information privacy law and policy. 
Hans Morgenthau famously argued in a seminal work examining 
power16 that “the element of power as the immediate goal of the pol-
icy pursued is explained and justified in ethical, legal, or biological 
terms.  That is to say: the true nature of the policy is concealed by 
ideological justifications and rationalizations.”17  In regard to privacy, 
I similarly argue that the stated reasons and purposes of information 
 10 See generally, Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft 
Problem, 80 TEX. L. REV. 89 (2001). 
 11 See generally, Nina Bernstein, Electronic Eyes: What the Computer Knows, N.Y. 
Times, A1, Sept. 15, 1997, 1997 WLNR 4871741. 
 12 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 1283 (2000) (arguing against treating personal information as property and 
suggesting a “breach of trust” cause of action based in tort law). 
 13 See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1193 (1998) (arguing for contractual default rules in favor of individuals). 
 14 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); Rich-
ard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 
GEO. L.J. 2381 (1996).  But see Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1125 (2000) (arguing that privacy cannot be properly protected by 
property rights). 
 15 DANIEL SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 101 (2004). 
 16 HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS:  THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND 
PEACE (5th ed. 1973). 
 17 Id. at 88. 
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privacy law conceal the true nature and driving forces of information 
privacy law.18  Moreover, the privacy debate and scholarship is at an 
impasse because the underlying force that is at the center of privacy 
law is also the white elephant in information privacy law: the domi-
nance of corporate power and corporate governance19 of information 
privacy law. 
A few definitional understandings are in order.20  When I speak 
of privacy and corporate power, I speak not of surveillance,21 but 
rather of domination over the individual.22  Furthermore, when I 
speak of privacy, I refer to information privacy—primarily in regard 
to federal statutory law23 and enforcement—rather than decisional 
privacy (such as the right to abortion)24 or other types of privacy.25  In 
 18 See infra Part III. 
 19 When I use the term “corporate governance” in this Article, I use it as short-
hand for “governance of others by corporations.”  In other words, as used in this Ar-
ticle, corporate governance should not be confused with the traditional understand-
ing of corporate governance, i.e., a corporation’s internal governance of itself. 
 20 This is particularly necessary because “[t]oday, we have hundreds of laws per-
taining to privacy—the common law torts, criminal law, evidentiary privileges, consti-
tutional law, at least twenty federal statutes, and numerous statutes in each of the fifty 
states.”  Daniel Solove, The Origins and Growth of Information Privacy Law, 828 PLI/PAT 
23, 27 (2005). 
 21 Surveillance can be thought of as “the cloak-and-dagger stuff of hidden micro-
phones” or alternatively as “the increasingly routine use of personal data and system-
atic information in the administration of institutions, agencies, and businesses.”  
JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR 2 (2001). 
 22 See generally, Solove, supra note 4. 
 23 Most notably, this Article’s scope does not include the constitutional right to 
information privacy.  One commentator explains the distinction between constitu-
tional decisional privacy and constitutional information privacy thusly: 
Four years after Roe v. Wade, in 1977, the Court held in Whalen v. Roe 
that the constitutionally protected ‘zone of privacy’ extends to two dis-
tinct types of interests: (1) ‘independence in making certain kinds of 
important decisions’; and (2) the ‘individual interest in avoiding dis-
closure of personal matters.’ The former interest describes Griswold 
and Roe; the latter interest was one that the Court had not yet defined. 
This latter interest has been called the ‘constitutional right to informa-
tion privacy.’ 
Solove, supra note 20, at 47. 
 24 The decisional/informational binary has been criticized by some scholars or 
acknowledged by others as a binary with overlapping areas: 
Information privacy concerns the collection, use, and disclosure of per-
sonal information.  Information privacy is often contrasted with “deci-
sional privacy,” which concerns the freedom to make decisions about 
one’s body and family . . . .  But information privacy increasingly incor-
porates elements of decisional privacy as the use of data both expands 
and limits individual autonomy. 
DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 1 (2003). 
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addition, this project primarily focuses on information privacy rela-
tions between corporations and individuals.  A larger project—which 
is beyond the scope of this Article—would focus more closely on the 
tripartite relationship between corporations, individuals, and the 
government in regard to information privacy.26
Part I of this Article will briefly canvass the current state of in-
formation privacy law and jurisprudence.  Part II argues that domes-
tic and international legal regimes are governed not only by govern-
ments but also by private actors, including corporations.  Part III 
presents three examples of corporations engaging in private govern-
ance of information privacy.  Part IV addresses some of the implica-
tions of the private governance model as applied to information pri-
vacy law. 
PART I 
THE CURRENT STATE OF INFORMATION PRIVACY 
Before embarking on the fundamental argument regarding cor-
porate power’s influence on the lack of consumer privacy, it is first 
necessary to briefly describe the current landscape of information 
privacy law and scholarship. 
A. Definitional Debates 
Privacy scholars have devoted much energy to defining the con-
cept of privacy.27  This definitional project has resulted in a wide array 
of notions of what privacy means.  For example, privacy has been 
variously understood to mean transparency,28 anonymity,29 the right 
to control one’s personal information,30 and the right to be let 
alone.31  Some privacy scholars understand information privacy to 
 25 See generally Anita L. Allen-Castellitto, Understanding Privacy: The Basics, 865 
PLI/PAT 23, 28 (2006) (stating that “[t]here are at least four basic types of privacy.  
They are (1) informational privacy; (2) physical privacy; (3) decisional privacy; and 
proprietary.”). 
 26 See generally ROBERT O’ HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE (2004) (examining this 
tripartite relationship). 
 27 “Privacy as a concept involves what privacy entails and how it is to be valued.   
Privacy as a right involves the extent to which privacy is (and should be) legally pro-
tected.”  SOLOVE ET AL., supra note 9, at 39. 
 28 See generally DENNIS BAILEY, THE OPEN SOCIETY PARADOX:  WHY THE 21ST CENTURY 
CALLS FOR MORE OPENNESS—NOT LESS (2004). 
 29 WESTIN, supra note 3, at 31–32. 
 30 See Anita Allen, Origins and Growth of U.S. Privacy Law, 701 PLI/PAT 83, 89 
(2002). 
 31 See generally, Warren & Brandeis, supra note 5. 
PEEK FINAL.DOC 10/20/2006  11:32:11 AM 
132 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:127 
 
mean secrecy.32  The secrecy paradigm posits that “privacy is invaded 
by uncovering one’s hidden world, by surveillance, and by the disclo-
sure of concealed information.”33  Similarly, “the invasion concep-
tion” understands privacy as “violated by the invasive actions of par-
ticular wrongdoers who cause direct injury to victims.”34  Other 
paradigms of privacy include surveillance, intrusion, solitude, mental 
distance, and limited access to the self.35  For example, Charles Fried 
argues that, “[p]rivacy is not simply an absence of information about 
us in the minds of others; rather it is the control we have over informa-
tion about ourselves.”36  Ruth Gavison describes privacy as “concern 
for limited accessibility,”37 while Jeffrey Rosen maintains that 
“[p]rivacy protects us from being misdefined and judged out of con-
text in a world of short attention spans, a world in which information 
can easily be confused with knowledge.”38  As one commentator ex-
plains, “[t]raditionally, privacy violations have been understood in a 
particular manner . . . .  The dominant metaphor for modern inva-
sions of privacy is Big Brother, the ruthless totalitarian government in 
George Orwell’s novel 1984.”39  Such understandings of privacy gen-
erally explore how the individual does, or should, construct his or her 
privacy, or lack thereof. 
Other scholars’ understandings of privacy incorporate broader 
concepts such as human dignity, self-development, and democracy.  
For example, Julie E. Cohen argues that “[t]he condition of no-
privacy threatens not only to chill the expression of eccentric indi-
viduality, but also, gradually, to dampen the force of our aspirations 
to it.”40  And Paul M. Schwartz contends that “[t]he maintenance of a 
democratic order requires both deliberative democracy and an indi-
vidual capacity for self-determination . . . .  [T]he emerging pattern 
 32 Of course, some scholars critique the notion of privacy altogether, arguing that 
“the best way to curtail the need for governmental control and intrusion is to have somewhat less 
privacy.” AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 213 (1999).  Other critics argue that 
privacy is not a distinct concept at all.  See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, The Information Pri-
vacy Law Project, 94 Georgetown L. J. 1087 134-35 (2006). 
 33 SOLOVE, supra note 15, at 8. 
 34 Id. 
 35 See generally, WESTIN, supra note 3. 
 36 Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968). 
 37 Gavison, supra note 3, at 423. 
 38 JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE:  THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 
8 (2000). 
 39 SOLOVE, supra note 15, at 7. 
 40 Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives:  Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1426 (2000). 
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of information use in cyberspace poses a risk to these two essential 
values.”41
B. Proposed Solutions 
Scholars approach the problem of information privacy law from 
a variety of approaches and with a myriad of doctrinal tools.  For ex-
ample, some scholars call for treating personal information as prop-
erty.42  Others argue that violations of personal information should 
be treated as tortious acts.43  Still others maintain that information 
privacy should be subsumed within the rubric of contract law; that is, 
consumers should have the ability to contract with companies for the 
use, sharing, or collection of their information.44
On the statutory side, some commentators call for a privacy re-
gime that covers the entire field, rather than the current sectoral ap-
proach to privacy.45  Such a regime would emulate the European Un-
ion’s comprehensive approach to informational privacy46 and would 
certainly evoke the Fair Information Practice Standards of 1977.47  
For example, in arguing for a change in the architecture of privacy, 
Daniel Solove responds negatively to those who argue for market-
based solutions to problems of information privacy48 and argues that 
 41 Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 
1658 (1999). 
 42 See supra note 14. 
 43 See supra note 12. 
 44 See supra note 13. 
 45 See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 15, at 101. 
 46 See Council Directive 95/46, art. 4, § 1(c), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 39 (EC). 
 47 Id. 
Fair Information Practices were recommended by the Report of the 
U.S. Privacy Protection Commission published in 1977.  Under various 
models of ‘fair information practices,’ standards such as these should 
be met to the extent possible: (1) the existence of data systems contain-
ing personal information should not be a secret; (2) personal informa-
tion should only be collected for narrow, specific purposes; (3) per-
sonal information should only be used in a ways that are similar to and 
consistent with the primary purposes for its collection; (4) personal in-
formation should be collected only with . . . informed consent . . . ; (5) 
personal information should not be shared with third parties without 
notice or consent; (6) . . . the duration of storage of personal informa-
tion should be limited; and (7) individuals should have access to per-
sonal information about themselves and should be permitted to correct 
errors; (8) those who collect personal data should insure the security 
and integrity of personal data and data systems.” 
Allen-Castellitto, supra note 25, at 35–36. 
 48 See SOLOVE, supra note 15, at 80–87.  Solove also argues that “law should hold 
that companies collecting and using our personal information stand in a fiduciary 
relationship with us.” Id. at 103.  
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“law must restructure our relationships with the entities collecting 
and using our personal information”49 that cause privacy failures and 
that information privacy is “a question of social design.”50  One of his 
proposals is to expand the jurisdiction of the FTC and provide the 
FTC with greater resources.51  Calls for a change in the architecture 
of information privacy appear to represent the coming trajectory of 
information privacy scholarship and law. 
C. Deficiencies in Federal Information Privacy Law 
The FTC and many federal privacy statutes have been criticized 
as not being effective enough in protecting privacy.52  These statutes 
include, inter alia, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,53 the Fair Credit Re-
porting Act and its amendment,54 the Fair and Accurate Credit Trans-
actions Act of 2003,55 the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 
1991,56 the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 (“HIPAA”),57 and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection 
Act.58  Generally, the scholarly discussion proceeds by attacking some 
of the flaws in these statutes and then suggesting some relatively mi-
nor patches, such as changing opt-out rights to opt-in rights.59
Yet most federal information privacy laws are toothless.  For ex-
ample, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act purports to protect individuals by 
requiring companies to disseminate privacy notices.60  But as has of-
 
 49 Id. at 226. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 108. 
 52 See, e.g., Paul Lansing & Mark D. Halter, Internet Advertising and Right to Privacy 
Issues, 80 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 181, 195 (2003). 
 53 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–09 (2000). 
 54 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000). 
 55 Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003). 
 56 Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2000)).  This 
Act “permits people to request that telemarketers not call them again.  If the tele-
marketer continues to call, people can sue for damages of up to five hundred dollars 
for each call.”  Solove, supra note 20, at 61. 
 57 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). 
 58 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06 (2000).  “HIPAA required the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) to draft regulations to protect the privacy of medical re-
cords.  HHS’s regulations, among other things, require that people authorize all uses 
and disclosures of their health information that are not for treatment, payment, or 
health care operation (such as for marketing purposes).”  Solove, supra note 20, at 
62. 
 59 See generally, Jeffrey M. Lacker, The Economics of Financial Privacy:  To Opt out or 
Opt in?, ECON. Q. FED. RES. BANK OF RICH., 7–10 (2002), available at 
http://privare.fbk.eur.nl/Literature/references/lacker_the%20economics%20of%2
0financial%20privacy_to%20opt%20out%20or%20opt%20in.pdf. 
 60 15 U.S.C.S. § 1603 (LexisNexis 2006). 
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ten been noted, these privacy policies in fact serve to inform indi-
viduals of what privacy consumers do not have, and are too cumber-
some and legalistic for most people to read.61  Moreover, they tend to 
make the option of opting out such a hassle that most consumers 
don’t even bother.62
Another example of federal privacy laws’ impotence is the Fair 
and Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003 (“FACTA”), which 
added new sections to the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(“FCRA”).63  The FCRA was intended to help consumers fight the 
growing crime of identity theft and protect their personal credit in-
formation.64  These federal statutes purport to give consumers the 
power to find out what is in their credit report and correct erroneous 
tradelines.  But the reality is that consumers have a notoriously diffi-
cult time when they try to have errors corrected.65  A large part of the 
reason it is so hard for individuals to correct errors is because these 
federal credit-reporting statutes are, for the most part, written in fa-
vor of the Credit Reporting Agencies (“CRA”).  For example, entities 
can only obtain your credit file for a “permissible purpose.”66  How-
ever, this “permissible purpose” requirement has been stretched to 
the point of irrelevancy.  The CRAs release credit reports carelessly, 
knowing that it will be difficult for any person to bring a successful 
suit against them, because the liability standard is malice or intent.67  
Thus, a CRA will only be found liable for sharing credit reports or 
failing to correct erroneous information if their actions were mali-
cious or intentional.  This standard of proof is much too high for 
consumers.  Negligence is generally what is occurring at the CRAs,68 
and the standard for liability should be just that—negligence. 
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) of 1991 was 
intended to protect the privacy interests of telephone users by re-
stricting telemarketers’ ability to place unsolicited calls.69  But as one 
 61 See, e.g., Janice A. Alwin, Comment, Privacy Planning: Putting the Privacy Statutes 
to Work for You, 14 DEPAUL BUS. L. J. 353, 362 (2002). 
 62 See infra, Part III.A. 
 63 15 U.S.C.S. § 1681–1681x (LexisNexis 2006). 
 64 15 U.S.C.S. § 1681 (LexisNexis 2006).  
 65 See, e.g., United States Public Interest Research Group, Mistakes Do Happen: 
Credit Report Errors Mean Consumers Lose, March 1998, at p. 9, http://uspirg.org/ 
uspirg.asp?id2=5970 (concluding that there is still tremendous difficulty in clearing 
one’s name after mistake or fraud occurs). 
 66 15 U.S.C.S. § 1681b (LexisNexis 2005). 
 67 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (2000). 
 68 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for 
Individual Rights?, 44 Fed. Comm. L.J. 195, 211-12 (1992). 
 69 See 47 U.S.C.S. § 227 (LexisNexis 2006).  
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scholar has noted, the very purpose of the statute is misguided: “[t]he 
TCPA . . . aims at redressing the aggravation of disruptive phone 
calls, and it does not govern the collection, use, or sale of personal 
data.”70
The preceding discussion regarding the inadequacy of federal 
statutory law is closely connected to a second problem with domestic 
information privacy law: the gaping areas of privacy that are left un-
protected and unaddressed by current law.  In other words, statutory 
law “protects” privacy by type, e.g., medical information, video rental 
information, financial information, etc.  “Despite the growth of the 
Information Society, the United States has resisted all calls for omni-
bus or comprehensive legal rules for fair information practice in the 
private sector.”71  As one scholar admonishes, a “strategy of narrowly 
targeted sector-specific reforms has been used in U.S. information 
privacy law for the last two decades with disastrous results . . . .”72  
These “disastrous results” have been the complete lack of protection 
for certain types of activities (rather than types of personal informa-
tion), such as grocery stores selling their customers’ data to corporate 
data aggregators such as Acxiom and ChoicePoint, and allowing such 
third party companies to construct disturbingly detailed profiles on 
millions of (indeed, most) Americans and American households.73
Moreover, the Privacy Act of 1974, arguably “the most compre-
hensive U.S. law pertaining to privacy,”74 applies only to government 
actors.  Therefore, “private corporations are not bound by the fair in-
formation practices, open-access rules, and data-ownership principles 
embodied in the Act.”75
PART II 
CORPORATE POWER AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Part II of this Article argues that the scholarly attempts at resolv-
ing problems in information privacy law have failed because there is a 
fundamental dynamic at work that has gone unrecognized.  Informa-
tion privacy laws actually have the effect of facilitating greater collec-
 70 SOLOVE, supra note 15, at 69. 
 71 Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Pri-
vate Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 500 (1995). 
 72 Jane K. Winn, Contracting Spyware by Contract, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1345, 1346 
(2005). 
 73 See Richard Behar, Never Heard of Acxiom? Chances Are It's Heard Of You, 
FORTUNE, Feb. 23, 2004, at 140. 
 74 John M. Eden, When Big Brother Privatizes: Commercial Surveillance, the Privacy Act 
of 1974, and the Future of RFID, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 20, *4 (2005). 
 75 Id. 
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tion, sharing, and use of personal information because information 
privacy is governed as much by corporate actions and corporate deci-
sion-making as by governmental regulation.  In other words, informa-
tion privacy is governed not just by governmental law but also by cor-
porations. 76
As Daniel Greenwood has observed: 
     Once corporations are understood as power sources, a part of 
our governance system rather than an object of it, then the market 
for law appears radically illegitimate, an example of the powerful seiz-
ing the power of the state to increase their own power.  Rather 
than seeing corporations as Tocquevillian intermediate institu-
tions restraining the state, we should see them as state-like them-
selves, part of the classic liberal nightmare of a state acting in its 
own interest and not that of its citizens.77
The required discussion that has thus far been largely ignored 
but is at the heart of information privacy law and policy is this: privacy 
laws and enforcement represent a façade of protection for consum-
ers, keeping them complacent in the purported knowledge that 
someone is protecting their privacy interests.  Information privacy law 
and privacy enforcement are primarily deflections from the fact that 
individuals’ privacy is a façade because corporate power drives infor-
mation privacy law. 
A. Corporate Power 
It is certainly well recognized that corporations exert enormous 
power78 both domestically and globally.79  Corporate power has been 
on the rise since the late nineteenth century,80 when corporations 
 76 I understand corporate power by defining power as “possession of control, au-
thority, or influence over others.”  M-W.com dictionary definition, http:// 
www.m-w.com/dictionary/power (last visited September 25, 2006). 
 77 Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Markets & Democracy: The Illegitimacy of Corporate Law, 
74 UMKC L. REV. 41, 44 (2005) (emphasis added). 
 78 Robert Dahl, Power as the Control of Behavior, in POWER 37 (Steven Lukes ed., 
1986).  “The analysis of power is often concerned . . . with the identification of elites 
and leadership, the discovery of the ways in which power is allocated to different 
strata, relations among leaders and between leaders and non-leaders, and so forth.”  
Id. 
 79 See generally, TED NACE, GANGS OF AMERICA 1 (2003) (“[T]he corporation has 
become the core institution of the modern world.  Designed to see profit and power, 
it has pursued both with endless tenacity, steadily bending the framework of law and 
even challenging the sovereign status of the state.”). 
 80 Comment, Katie J. Thoennes, Frankenstein Incorporated: The Rise of Corporate 
Power and Personhood in the United States, 28 HAMLINE L. REV. 203, 205 (2005) 
(“[C]orporations have come to dominate society and politics at both a national and 
state level by securing for themselves rights and privileges that were once reserved 
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were recognized as legal persons.81  It has been reported that twenty-
two American corporations have a market capitalization greater than 
the gross domestic product of twenty-two specified individual na-
tions.82  Moreover, a recent Business Week poll showed that nearly 
three-quarters of Americans think “[b]usiness has gained too much 
power over too many aspects of American life.”83  One commentator 
has stated with alarm that “as corporations gain in autonomous insti-
tutional power and become more detached from people and place, 
the human interest and the corporate interest increasingly diverge.”84  
Indeed, scholars have even gone so far as to attribute godly status to 
corporations.85  This corporate power has, more often than not, been 
at the expense of individuals.  Corporations drive the continual ero-
sion of personal information privacy.  It is not just the data aggrega-
tors or data brokers driving this erosion; rather, it is the entirety of 
corporate America and Fortune 500 companies that view personal in-
formation as a commodity and believe that it is their corporate right 
to exploit and manipulate personal information as they see fit.86
Individuals’ personal information is of enormous economic 
value to the business world.  In fact, personal information fuels the 
wheels of commerce.  According to one scholar, 
Marketers “rent” lists of names and personal information from da-
tabase companies, which charge a few cents to a dollar for each 
name.  Over 550 companies compose the personal information 
industry, with annual revenues in the billions of dollars.  The sale 
of mailing lists alone (not including the sales generated by the use 
of the lists) generates $3 billion a year.  The average consumer is 
on around 100 mailing lists and is included in at least 50 data-
bases.  An increasing number of companies with databases . . . are 
exclusively for the American people.”). 
 81 Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (wherein the 
Court stated that “[t]he Court does not wish to hear argument on the question 
whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which for-
bids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws, applies to these corporations.  We are all of opinion that it does.”). 
 82 LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY 2 (2001). 
 83 Business Week/Harris Poll: How Business Rates: By the Numbers, BUS. WK., Sept. 
11, 2000, at 144 available at http://www.businessweek.com/2000/00_37/ 
b3698004.htm. 
 84 DAVID. C. KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE THE WORLD (2001). 
 85 See generally, Douglas Litowitz, The Corporation as God, 30 J. CORP. L. 501 (2005). 
 86 See, e.g., Paul Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 
1609, 1633–34 (1999) (arguing that “personal information in the private sector is of-
ten unaccompanied by the presence of basic legal protections.  Yet, private enter-
prises now control more powerful resources of information technology than ever be-
fore.”). 
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realizing that their databases are becoming one of their most 
valuable assets . . . .87
Because personal information is of such importance to corporations 
and because corporations exert so much influence in the realm of in-
formation privacy, the problem of the erosion of individual informa-
tion privacy can be solved only by crippling corporations’ strangle-
hold on our information privacy laws and policies.88
It is important to draw a distinction between “corporate power” 
and a more general concept of “business power.”  As has been well 
established in the political, economic, and legal literature, the corpo-
ration is a unique historical and sociological beast that is both for-
mally and instrumentally very much different from other business en-
tities, such as partnerships or sole proprietorships.  As David C. 
Korten describes corporations in his influential work, When Corpora-
tions Rule the World: 
The publicly-traded, limited liability corporation is capitalism’s in-
stitutional form of choice because it allows the virtually unlimited 
concentration of power with minimal public accountability or le-
gal liability.  Actual shareholders . . . bear no personal liability be-
yond the value of their investments.  Directors and officers are 
protected from financial liability from acts of negligence or com-
mission by the corporation’s massive legal resources and com-
pany-paid insurance policies. . . . Unlike real people, who are 
eventually rendered equal by the grave, corporations are able to 
grow and reproduce themselves without limit, “living” and amass-
ing power indefinitely.89
In other words, concerns regarding the social ills emanating 
from business tend to focus on the limited liability corporation be-
cause, “the large, limited-liability, publicly traded . . . corporations 
dominate our economy, politics, and culture. The limited-liability 
corporation dominates our entire society.”90
Moreover, as Lawrence Mitchell forcefully argues, corporations’ 
primary purpose is to maximize shareholders’ short-term profits.91  
 87 SOLOVE, supra note 15, at 19. 
 88 Indeed, information privacy law and enforcement is merely an exercise in le-
gitimization, i.e., a cover or masquerade for corporate domination of the American 
consumer. 
 89 KORTEN, supra note 84, at 104–05.  See generally, Litowitz, supra note 85, at 525 
(“The underlying dilemma is that corporations have tremendous economic and po-
litical power (not to mention their power to shape public opinion) but they are ruled 
by a handful of appointed managers.”). 
 90 Charlie Cray & Lee Drutman, Corporations and the Public Purpose: Restoring the 
Balance, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 305, 306 (2005). 
 91 MITCHELL, supra note 82, at 4–5. 
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Thus, corporations’ main purpose conflicts with many values of 
community such as environmental protection, wage increases, and 
privacy. 
The understanding that corporate power is a dominant global 
and domestic force is merely a foundational understanding for un-
earthing the dynamic at the core of the impasse in information pri-
vacy law. 
B. Governance by Corporations 
As critical legal scholars argue, law often serves merely as legiti-
mization or rationalization of the existing structure; in other words, 
ostensibly neutral norms and laws deflect attention from hegemonic 
forces.92  This argument can also be applied to information privacy 
law, inasmuch as most of our U.S. information privacy laws are seem-
ingly neutral but in fact are largely driven by corporate interests—and 
thus erode consumer privacy rather than enhance it.  In the field of 
information privacy and in the law more generally, “[c]orporations 
are power centers, loci of value struggles, political fora.  They are not 
citizens but governance structures and not neutral but deeply influ-
ential—if illegitimate—participants in our political struggles.”93
Drawing upon the general concept of corporate power, many 
scholars have observed that authority, legal norms, and governance 
are not solely the province of government.  Specifically, corporations 
exert authority via “specific modes through which corporate actors 
create and shape legal regimes.”94  While some commentators de-
scribe this dynamic as one in which corporate actors exercise author-
ity or shape legal norms, other forward-looking scholars have gone 
further and argue that when corporations shape the content of legal 
regimes in a way that resembles government rulemaking and en-
forcement, they are actually engaged in governance.95  Some of these 
scholars refer to the symbiotic relationship between government and 
multiple non-governmental actors, such as corporations, as the “new 
governance.”  Orly Lobel argues that “[t]he new governance model 
challenges . . . conventional assumptions . . . [and] broadens the de-
 92 Cf. Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform & Retrenchment: Transformation 
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) (arguing 
that the racism inherent in purportedly neutral norms must be exposed). 
 93 Greenwood, supra note 77, at 43. 
 94 Dan Danielsen, How Corporations Govern: Taking Corporate Power Seriously in 
Transnational Regulation and Governance, 46 HARV. INT’L L. J. 411, 412 (2005). 
 95 Id.  “To govern” means “to control the actions or behavior of” or “to exercise a 
deciding or determining influence on.”  AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 
588 (3d ed. 1993). 
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cision-making playing field by involving more actors in the various 
stages of the legal process . . . [Thereby, t]he exercise of normative 
authority is pluralized.”96  Dan Danielson explains that this govern-
ance is engendered by way of various types of corporate behavior: 
Sometimes corporations contribute through interpretations of or 
reactions to a legal rule scheme.  Sometimes they supply rules 
where none exist.  Sometimes they shape the rule scheme 
through direct political or economic pressure on regulators.  
Sometimes they shape it by evading the rule scheme and doing 
business elsewhere.  Sometimes, to satisfy other business pur-
poses, they adopt more stringent practices than the applicable 
rules require.  Sometimes they act on their own to get a market 
edge or exploit an opportunity.97  Sometimes they act in groups to 
create a harmonized regulatory environment or to prevent regu-
lation. . . . When corporations create or shape the content, interpretation, 
efficacy, or enforcement of legal regimes and, in so doing, produce effects 
on social welfare similar to the effects resulting from rulemaking and en-
forcement by governments, corporate actors are engaged in governance.98
In other words, when corporations affect the law in ways that 
produce effects similar to those that result from governmental law, 
corporate private governance is occurring.  While it is common to 
confuse the term “governance” with “government,” the two terms are 
entirely distinct; indeed, the concept of government is but a subset of 
the broader concept of governance.  “Governance involves interac-
tion between the formal institutions and those in civil society.  Gov-
ernance refers to a process whereby elements in society wield power, 
authority and influence and enact policies and decisions concerning 
public life and social upliftment.”99
Of course, the concept of governance by corporations may be 
viewed as contrary to democratic principles because generally, “[f]or 
lawyers, governance is a constitutional issue.”100  However, the “le-
 96 Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 373 (2004). 
 97 For example, in some instances, so-called competitors “collude through cartels 
or strategic alliances to increase profits by setting market prices above the level of op-
timal efficiency.”  KORTEN, supra note 84, at 82. 
 98 Danielson, supra note 94, at 412 (emphasis added). 
 99 The Global Development Research Center, Understanding the Concept of Govern-
ance, http://www.gdrc.org/u-gov/governance-understand.html (last visited on Oct. 
9, 2006). 
 100 Christoph Engel, A Constitutional Framework for Private Governance 2 (MPI Col-
lective Goods Preprint No. 2001/4, Mar. 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=269310 (last visited September 3, 2006). 
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gitimacy” question vis-à-vis private governance101 is beyond the scope 
of this Article.  More importantly, “the normative statement that only 
duly elected and representative governments ‘ought’ to be capable of 
exercising political authority must not be confused with the empirical 
fact that corporations ‘are’ increasingly functioning authoritatively in 
ruling themselves and others.”102
The central focus of this Article is that the traditional under-
standing of governance as emanating solely from the government 
must be—and is being—rethought.  Indeed, to dichotomously un-
derstand corporate acts as “private” and government acts as “pub-
lic”103 “does not do justice to the dynamic interconnectedness of each 
move and countermove by state and corporate actors.”104  Govern-
ments and corporate actors are engaged in an intricate and pro-
foundly symbiotic dance of acting and reacting to the other’s behav-
iors, decisions, and regulations.  The legal “rules” therefore often 
reflect a series of decisions and behaviors on the part of private actors 
and the government that together form the authoritative norm.  As 
Paul Schiff Berman has noted, “[l]egal scholars and policymakers 
have an unfortunate tendency to assume that legal norms, once es-
tablished, simply take effect and constitute a legal regime.”105  More-
over, Berman applauds the groundbreaking academics that study ac-
tual practices and real-life exercises of authority to determine the true 
legal regime.  He observes that such scholars: 
refuse to focus solely on who has the formal authority to articulate 
norms or the coercive power to enforce them.  Instead, they aim 
to study empirically which statements of authority tend to be 
 101 Randy Barnett argues that: 
[a] lawmaking system is legitimate if there is a prima facie duty to obey 
the laws it makes.  Neither “consent of the governed” nor “benefits re-
ceived” justifies obedience.  Rather, a prima facie duty of obedience ex-
ists either (a) if there is actual unanimous consent to the jurisdiction of 
the lawmaker or, in the absence of consent, (b) if laws are made by 
procedures which assure that they are not unjust. 
Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 111 (2003). 
 102 CUTLER, supra note 1, at 33. 
 103 Indeed, in 1969 John Galbraith argued that certain corporations are in fact 
public institutions:  “By no known definition of private enterprise can these special-
ized firms or subsidiaries be classified as private corporations.”  John Kenneth 
Galbraith, The Big Defense Firms Are Really Public Firms and Should Be Nationalized, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., Nov. 16, 1969, at 50. 
 104 Danielson, supra note 94, at 415. 
 105 Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485, 498 (2005). 
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treated as binding in actual practice and by whom. . . .  Accord-
ingly, the nation-state is denied any special status as a law-giver.106
Similarly, Claire Cutler chides those who would rather sweep the real-
ity of private governance under a formalistic rug: 
[T]he move of private authority to obscurity is at root an ideo-
logical move inspired by the “liberal art of separation” that serves 
to isolate and insulate increasing aspects of existence from public 
scrutiny and review.  The formalistic associations of authority with 
the state function ideologically by depicting the world not as it is 
but as it ought to be.107
An understanding of corporate behavior that incorporates the 
notion that corporations actually shape the legal structure and actu-
ally govern alongside local, state, and national governments allows an 
understanding of corporate power that is something more than a 
vague concept of which everyone is aware but which few can coher-
ently explain.  Understanding corporate power as a type of govern-
ance in the domestic (and transnational) spheres renders the amor-
phous concrete.  For example, in the regulatory scheme, there may 
exist a governmental law alongside corporate behavior regarding that 
same law.  In reality, the corporate “rules” and behaviors may—and 
increasingly do—represent the dominant mode of behavior and the 
actual mode of governance in that area.  As another example, corpo-
rations may choose to act in ways that openly and egregiously violate 
the legislative mandate because governmental deterrence is weak and 
ineffective.  These intentional violations may nevertheless operate as 
the “rule” in the respective arena and thus govern the field as au-
thoritative.108  Furthermore, corporations may interpret legislation in 
a way that favors corporate interests, and the government may acqui-
esce in this interpretation through silence and inaction.  A final ex-
ample is the profound effect that corporate lobbying has on the ulti-
mate statutory language of privacy statutes and regulatory rules.109  As 
 106 Id. at 510. 
 107 Cutler, supra note 1, at 24. 
 108 Anthony J. Fejfar, Corporate Voluntarism: Panacea or Plague? A Question of Horizon, 
17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859, 923 (1992) (“Corporations influence legislation and its en-
forcement through lobbying and through the failure to abide by enacted laws and 
regulations.”). 
 109 See generally Matt Taibbi, The Secret History of the Most Corrupt Man in Washington, 
ROLLING STONE MAG., at 38 (Apr. 4, 2006) (profiling lobbyist Jack Abramoff); Jon 
Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Criti-
cal Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003).  Interna-
tionally, some scholars argue the situation is even worse.   
Outside Europe and the U.S., the extent to which states have become 
rule-takers rather than rule-makers is greater than most citizens think, 
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many commentators note, corporations exert tremendous power 
through “their political action committees, their lobbyists, [and] their 
lawyers.”110
Conceptualizing governance as a symbiotic relationship between 
governmental and non-governmental actors engenders an under-
standing of the specific nature of corporate power.  Susan Sassen ar-
gues that the question is whether “the weight of private . . . interests 
in [the] specific work of the state become[s] constitutive of that au-
thority and indeed produce[s] a hybrid that is neither fully private 
nor fully public?”111  Sassen answers her own question in the affirma-
tive.  Indeed, this is the fundamental difference between dualism and 
unity theories.  In a dualistic world, the public and the private are dis-
tinct worlds and operate separately in their own spheres.  In a unified 
world, the public and the private interact organically and the ensuing 
legal regime is just that—organic and informed by both spheres. 
Scholars in the field of transnational law have explored this 
phenomenon under the academic terminology of “transnational gov-
ernance.”112  For example, one commentator in the field notes that 
“[c]onstitutions were designed to frame states, and to frame the law 
within the state.  Today, however, it seems that the social engineering 
and controls embodied in such instruments have given way to ‘gov-
ernance’—a loose network of constitutionally invisible, often private, 
largely because when governments announce new regulatory laws they 
are somewhat embarrassed to disclose that the national legislature 
voted for those laws without having any say in shaping them. 
JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 3 (2000). 
 110 NACE, supra note 79, at 12.  For example, “[t]hrough trade agreements, corpo-
rate libertarians press governments to provide absolute protection for the intellectual 
property rights of corporations.”  KORTEN, supra note 84, at 81.  Another commenta-
tor writes: 
     Lobbying is yet another source of corporate influence on law.  Most, 
if not all, major corporations employ legislative liaisons assigned to 
monitor legislative activities and to coordinate lobbying efforts to as-
sure that the corporate viewpoint is heard.  In addition, virtually every 
industry has some sort of trade association or manufacturer’s associa-
tion designed to present the common interests of the otherwise com-
peting firms. Managing the law and the legislative process has become 
a tool of competitive strategy. 
Daniel T. Ostas, Deconstructing Corporate Social Responsibility: Insights from Legal and Eco-
nomic Theory, 38 AM. BUS. L. J. 261, 270–71 (2001). 
 111 Saskia Sassen, The State and Globalization, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE 
AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 91 (Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker 
eds., 2002). 
 112 See, e.g., TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: INTERNATIONAL 
STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF PRIVATE LAW (Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand & 
Gunther Teubner, eds., 2004). 
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actors.”113  International law scholars recognize that multinational 
corporations have begun to take over the role of the state in many ar-
eas.  “As the state was once the exclusive subject of international law, 
the corporation, the state’s creation, has now become a primary sub-
ject displacing the state’s exclusivity in this sphere just as it has dis-
placed state ownership and regulation in the market.”114
Although the concept of corporate and private governance is be-
ing explored widely in the transnational law literature,115 there is a 
relative dearth116 of scholarly work on the topic in the realm of do-
mestic law.117  As Paul Berman argues, “because legal scholars are so 
focused on the official organs of legal power—nation-state govern-
ments—they have been less likely to embrace ideas about norm-
development in non-state arenas.”118  Dan Danielson notes that 
“scholars have focused little attention on explicating the precise 
mechanisms through which corporations contribute to transnational 
regulation and governance or the extent to which the social welfare 
effects of regulation and policy may be attributable to corporate activ-
ity.”119  This Article is an endeavor to bring the concept of corporate 
private governance into the domestic sphere and, specifically, into 
the informational privacy literature. 
PART III 
CORPORATIONS’ GOVERNANCE OF INFORMATION PRIVACY 
In the area of information privacy, corporations have been given 
wide leeway to govern, i.e., to affect domestic information privacy in 
 113 Andras Sajo, Book Review, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 697, 697 (2005). 
 114 Joel R. Paul, Holding Multinational Corporations Responsible Under International 
Law, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 285, 290 (2001). 
 115 See id. at 285–86 (noting that “private individuals and non-governmental or-
ganizations acting both internationally and domestically are contributing to the 
emergence of new international norms.  These new international norms confer 
greater rights and obligations on private individuals and firms, shifting the focus of 
international law.”). 
 116 As one scholar argues, “[p]rivate [governance] is not a new phenomenon, but 
public interest in it is.  This explains why there is no coherent legal framework for 
private [governance] yet.”  Engel, supra note 100, at 23. 
 117 But see John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: 
Theory versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1, 6 
(arguing that “understanding the realities of [corporate social responsibility] pro-
vides a unique opportunity to test new governance theory against practice”);  Lobel, 
supra note 96, at 342 (arguing for a shift in legal thought from a regulatory to a new 
governance model). 
 118 Berman, supra note 105, at 490. 
 119 Danielson, supra note 94, at 411. 
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ways that produce effects similar to those that result from govern-
mental law. 
In Part III, I will present three examples of corporations’ govern-
ing the field of information privacy law through corporate action and 
symbiotic government action or inaction.  The first is an example of 
corporations’ interpretation of privacy law; the second example dem-
onstrates corporations’ bypassing of privacy legislation; and the third 
example describes corporations’ intentional violation of information 
privacy laws.  Each of these examples represents more than corporate 
action or reaction to governmental law.  Instead, these examples 
demonstrate the manners by which corporations have engaged in 
private governance and shaped the information privacy regime. 
I argue that: (1) when corporations’ actions have an effect on 
the market that resembles the effect of governmental authority and 
(2) that corporate authority goes largely unchallenged and is, in fact, 
accepted as the social norm, corporations are engaging in govern-
ance.120
To give practical meaning to this definition, it might prove use-
ful to imagine on a broader level what governance means in our eve-
ryday life.  Governance is not just state, local, and federal govern-
ments passing laws or ordinances and then subjecting offenders to 
criminal penalties or other sanctions.  Governance is the product of 
an interlocking web of actors, both governmental and “private,” that 
defines how citizens live their lives and the expectations society has 
regarding any specific field or topic.  Thus, the relevant source of au-
thority is not merely formal law.  As Christoph von Engel contends, 
“Most private governance is not legal in nature.  Rather, it uses social 
norms or a technical code.”121  More specifically, Claire Cutler argues 
that “the privatization of government activities, the deregulation of 
industries and sectors, increased reliance on market mechanisms in 
 120 Informal private governance is to be distinguished from formal private govern-
ance.  Thus, for example, the Mafia internal governance operates informally and of-
ten via force.  See, e.g., Phil Williams, Transnational Organized Crime and the State, in 
THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 167 (Rodney Bruce 
Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002) (“The power of criminal organizations is a 
threat to the state as sovereign entity in that the state claims a monopoly of coercive 
power; criminal organizations also exercise such power and use violence to remove 
competitors and obstacles to their businesses.”).  Formal private governance struc-
tures, by contrast, include such bodies as non-governmental organizations and man-
datory professional associations such as medical boards.  See Rodney Bruce Hall & 
Thomas J. Biersteker, The Emergence of Private Authority in the International System, in 
THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 13–16 (Rodney  Bruce 
Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002). 
 121 See Engel, supra note 100, at 3. 
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general, and the delegation of regulatory authority to private business 
associations and agencies are expanding the opportunities for the 
emergence of private and self-regulatory regimes.”122
As Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J. Biersteker explain: 
A growing number of actors—actors other than the state—appear 
to have taken on authoritative roles and functions in the interna-
tional system. . . . While these new actors are not states, are not 
state-based, and do not rely exclusively on the actions or explicit 
support of states in the international arena, they often convey 
and/or appear to have been accorded some form of legitimate 
authority.  That is, they perform the role of authorship over some 
important issue or domain.  They claim to be, perform as, and are 
recognized as legitimate by some larger public (that often in-
cludes the states themselves) as authors of policies, of practices, of 
rules, and of norms.  They set agendas, they establish boundaries 
or limits for action. . . .  In short, they do many of the things tradi-
tionally, and exclusively, associated with the state.  They act simul-
taneously both in the domestic and in the international arenas.  
What is most significant, however, is that they appear to have been 
accorded a form of legitimate authority.123
As explained in Part II, the modern notion of governance cor-
rectly incorporates an understanding that true governance is not 
comprised solely of monolithic governmental law;124 rather, govern-
ance involves a host of actors that define and shape citizens’ behavior, 
their expectations, and their accepted understandings.  Our defini-
tion of governance should therefore be expanded to include the mul-
tiple actors in the domestic and international arena that have become 
part of the domestic and international governance regime. 
A. Corporate Interpretation of Privacy Legislation: The Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act 
In Part II of this Article, I noted that Danielsen observed that 
one of the ways that corporations govern is “through interpretations 
of or reactions to a legal rule scheme.”125  In the realm of information 
privacy, this is one of the primary ways in which corporations have 
managed to govern the field. 
One example of this phenomenon is corporations’ interpreta-
tion of the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLB Act” or the “Act”), 
 122 Cutler, supra note 1, at 23. 
 123 See Hall & Biersteker, supra note 120, at 4. 
 124 See Engel, supra note 100, at 2 (arguing to “put an end to the idea that gov-
ernment has a monopoly on governance”). 
 125 See supra. Part II.B  
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which, inter alia, purports to protect individuals’ personal data by re-
quiring companies to disseminate privacy notices.  In short, the Act: 
allows financial institutions with different branches or affiliates 
engaging in different services to share the “nonpublic personal 
information” among each branch of the company.  Affiliates must 
inform customers of the information sharing, but people have no 
right to stop the companies from sharing it.  However, when fi-
nancial institutions desire to share customer data with third par-
ties, people have a right to opt-out.126
Thus, the law purports to legislate the privacy practices of financial 
companies. 
Many commentators on information privacy criticize the Act, 
maintaining that the Act contains so many loopholes as to virtually 
eviscerate the effectiveness of the law.127  Financial institutions are al-
lowed to share customer data with virtually any third-party company 
(i.e., non–affiliated companies) as long as they give customers a right 
to “opt out” of these sharing practices. 
Paul Schwartz and Edward Janger summarize the findings of a 
privacy advocacy group regarding the lack of effectiveness of the GLB 
Act: 
Explanations of how to opt out invariably appear at the end of the 
notices.  Thus, before they learn how to opt out, consumers must 
trudge through up to ten pages of fine print . . . .  [M]any pas-
sages regarding opt-out . . . are obviously designed to discourage 
consumers from exercising their rights under the statute.  For ex-
ample, some financial institutions include an opt-out box only in 
a thicket of misleading statements . . . .  Other entities attempt to 
dissuade consumers by implying that consumers may have already 
opted out or that opting out will accomplish little.  A final tactic 
of the GLB Act privacy notices is to state that consumers who opt-
out may fail to receive “valuable offers.”128
In short, financial institutions’ reaction to the GLB Act’s opt-out 
requirement has been an industry-wide effort to make the opt-out 
right virtually meaningless.  Corporations interpret the Act to mean 
that as long as they give some sort of opt-out right—however, mini-
mal and toothless—to their customers, they fall within the legal pa-
rameters of the Act.  Hence began the bombardment of customers 
 126 Solove, supra note 20, at 63. 
 127 See e.g., Edward Janger & Paul Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley-Act, Information 
Privacy, and the Limit of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1231 (2002); Mark 
Hochhauser, Lost in the Fine Print: Readability of Financial Privacy Notices, July 2001, 
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/GLB-Reading.htm. 
 128 Janger & Schwartz, supra note 127, at 1231 (internal quotations omitted). 
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with corporate privacy policies containing legalistic terminology, 
lengthy explanations of the institution’s privacy practices, and opt-out 
provisions that often require the customer to take proactive steps to 
write to the company at an obscure snail mail address and specify that 
she wishes to opt out of data sharing.129
In other words, the opt-out right is meaningless in practice; the 
right to opt out of the trafficking of one’s personal information is ex-
plained in lengthy, legalistic privacy policies that most people throw 
away as just more junk mail.  If the consumer actually bothers to read 
the policy and recognizes it is of some import, she is likely to be un-
able to decipher what the company’s privacy policies actually are and 
exactly how she can opt out of their sharing practices. 
American corporations’ interpretation of the GLB Act has had 
an effect on the market that resembles the effect of governmental au-
thority.  Moreover, the interpretation of the GLB Act by private actors 
has gone largely unchallenged—indeed, it is accepted as the social 
norm. 
This corporate interpretation of the notice requirement of the 
GLB Act and its reaction to that requirement has resulted in a gov-
ernance regime in which consumers’ choice regarding sharing of 
their information with non-affiliated companies has become a virtu-
ally meaningless concept.  Corporations’ interpretation of the Act 
and their industry-wide reaction to the Act has resulted in a system in 
which financial institutions can share customers’ information without 
restraint in the absence of some rare opt out from the rare individual 
who has waded through the muddy waters of a corporate privacy pol-
icy and reacted in kind.  This systematic practice has an effect on the 
market similar to the effect of governmental authority; in this arena, 
corporations “perform the role of authorship”130 in the area of privacy 
practices under the GLB Act.  That is, corporations “perform as, and 
are recognized as legitimate by some larger public (that often in-
cludes the states themselves) as authors of policies, of practices, of 
rules, and of norms”131 in the realm of financial institutions’ privacy 
practices.  In this domain, corporations—not the government—”set 
agendas [and] establish boundaries or limits for action.”132
 129 See generally, Annie I. Anton, Julia B. Earp, Davide Bolchini, Qingfeng He, Car-
los Jensen & William Stufflebeam, The Lack of Clarity in Financial Privacy Policies and 
the Need for Standardization, N.C. STATE U. CSC TECHNICAL REP. #TR-2003-14 (2003), 
available at http://www.theprivacyplace.com/papers/glb_secPriv_tr.pdf. 
 130 Hall & Biersteker, supra note 120, at 4. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
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In addition, corporations have, through their interpretation of 
the GLB Act, adopted industry-wide practices that not only have be-
come the social norm but have also become socially acceptable.  As 
Susan Strange argues, to the extent that non-governmental actors 
such as corporations and other private companies acquire power and 
“to the extent their power is not challenged, they are implicitly le-
gitimized as authoritative.”133  But it is not just that corporate power 
in this domain has gone unchallenged and is therefore implicitly au-
thoritative; it is also that the privacy patterns and privacy practices of 
financial institutions have infiltrated the society’s consciousness in 
such a way that these patterns and practices have become expected 
and are deemed acceptable.  This phenomenon reflects the exercise 
of power described by Steven Lukes as the “third dimension of 
power”134 by which “potential issues are kept out of politics, whether 
through the operation of social forces and institutional practices or 
through individuals’ decisions.”135  This is also an example of what 
Harvard economist Andrei Shleifer calls “cognitive persuasion”:136 the 
 133 Id. at 6 (summarizing Strange’s argument). 
 134  
Luke's framework traces power in three dimensions: decisional power, 
agenda power, and manipulative power.  The first dimension, deci-
sional power, is the ability to decide the outcome of an issue in conflict. 
. . . Luke's second dimension, agenda power, is the ability to determine 
what issues will and will not be raised for decision.  To the extent that A 
has agenda power over B, A can negate B's first dimension power to 
make decisions by foreclosing B's decision making opportunities.  A 
special aspect of these two dimensions of power is that they function in 
circumstances of overt conflict. 
     Unlike decisional and agenda power, third dimension power does 
not operate in a climate of conflict, but rather prevents circumstances 
of overt conflict from occurring by creating a manipulated consensus. 
Manipulative power is the ability to shape the wants and perceptions of 
another.  This power operates primarily through manipulation of in-
formation.  Third dimension power is the most effective form of power 
because it insidiously gains the support, or at least the neutrality, of 
others even to their own detriment.  A, by manipulating B's percep-
tions, can eviscerate any power that B might have to contribute to the 
agenda or make decisions. 
Moira T. Roberts, Note, Individual Rights and Government Power in Collision, 49 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1023, 1037–38 (1992). 
 135 JOHN GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS: QUIESCENCE AND REBELLION IN THE 
APPALACHIAN VALLEY 12 (1980).  “In a nutshell, Luke’s first dimension is simple, tra-
ditional authority; the second dimension is the power to put issues on the agenda; 
and the third is the power to actually influence or affect public opinion, as the media 
so often does.”  Saru Jayaraman, Letting the Canary Lead: Power and Participation Among 
Latino/a Immigration Workers, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 103, 108 (2001). 
 136 Craig Lambert, Resisting Temptation: Economics Discovers the Irrational, HARV. 
MAG. Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 57 (describing Shleifer’s work). 
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process by which the persuader (in this case the financial corpora-
tion) convinces people of an idea by triggering associations that are 
consistent with our beliefs and that resonate with our pre-existing 
ideas.  In the case at hand, corporations send detailed “privacy poli-
cies” to customers that are in fact anti-privacy policies.  Yet the con-
sumer receives a document labeled “Privacy Policy” and, based on ra-
tional expectations and ideas about what privacy means (i.e., 
associations), is persuaded that the policy is indeed about the many 
ways in which their financial institution vigilantly protects their pri-
vacy. 
Of course, this private governance could not exist—and might 
be proven non-authoritative—without the inaction of the govern-
ment.  Congress could, of course, amend the legislation so that cus-
tomers must opt in to sharing practices rather than opt out.  Con-
gress could also amend the legislation such that clear, 
understandable, and easy opt-out provisions are mandatory.  But in 
the absence of governmental action, corporations’ interpretation and 
molding of the Act operate as the dominant governing force: “[t]o 
the extent that regulators . . . acquiesce in or do not react to the 
standards selected [by corporations], one could reasonably say the . . 
. rule . . . is established by the decisions of . . . corporate actors.”137
B. Corporate Bypassing of Privacy Legislation: The Children’s Online 
Privacy and Protection Act 
The Children’s Online Privacy and Protection Act138 (“COPPA” 
or the “Act”) was passed in 2000 with the purpose of protecting chil-
dren from the dangers and lures of the Internet by protecting the 
personal information of children (those under the age of thirteen) 
online.  COPPA aims to do this primarily by requiring parental con-
sent before a commercial website or an online service directed at 
children139 collects, uses, or discloses personal information on a child.  
The COPPA Rule,140 which implements COPPA, also requires that 
websites and online services “[e]stablish and maintain reasonable 
procedures to protect the confidentiality, security, and integrity of 
 137 Danielsen, supra note 94, at 414. 
 138 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–08 (2000). 
 139 This includes websites or online services that have knowledge that they collect 
personal information from children.  FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ET AL., HOW TO 
COMPLY WITH THE CHILDREN’S ONLINE PRIVACY PROTECTION RULE 9 (1999), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/coppa.pdf. 
 140 Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2006). 
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personal information collected from children.”141  The Act requires 
that websites subject to COPPA post a privacy policy informing par-
ents of their privacy practices and the contact information for each 
operator of their website.142
How have corporations treated the Act? 
First, as Susan Crawford has explained, the Act “has not been a 
success; many sites have elected simply not to provide interactive ser-
vices for children under thirteen rather than cope with the exacting 
oversight and notice requirements of the Act.”143
Second, sites that do provide services to children and are clearly 
subject to the Act have chosen to either ignore the requirements of 
the Act or, in many cases, comply with COPPA’s facile require-
ments—such as posting a boilerplate privacy policy144— while ignor-
ing the more burdensome requirements such as the parental consent 
and notification mechanisms.145  For example, in a 2002 FTC study on 
COPPA compliance, researchers found that only forty-seven percent 
of children-directed sites had any parental consent and notification 
mechanisms in place.146
Third, other sites deflect the issue by requiring online users to 
simply check a box stating that they are thirteen or older before gain-
ing access to the site.147   
Fourth, in a similar vein, some corporations simply deflect the is-
sue by stating on their website that they don’t sell products or provide 
services to children or that they do not collect information from chil-
 141 See 16 C.F.R. § 312.3(e) (2006). 
 142 In addition, entities subject to the Act must allow parents to access any per-
sonal information on their child and delete it or opt out of future collection, and 
such entities must limit their collection of children’s personal information to that 
which is reasonably necessary to participate in the activity.  Id. 
 143 Susan P. Crawford, Shortness of Vision: Regulatory Ambition in the Digital Age, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 695, 706 n.45 (2005). 
 144 As of 2002, ninety percent of child-directed sites posted a privacy policy.  Fed-
eral Trade Commission Staff Report, Protecting Children’s Privacy Under COPPA: A Sur-
vey on Compliance, at 5, Apr. 2002, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/ 
04/coppasurvey.pdf#search=%22Protecting%20Children's%20Privacy%20Under%2
0COPPA%3A%20A%20Survey%20on%20Compliance%22. 
 145 Notably, COPPA does not require that privacy policies indicate the methods 
that parents can use to obtain notice and provide consent.  See id. at 18. 
 146 See id. at 12. 
 147 See Complaint at 6, United States v. Xanga.com, No.: 06-CIV-6853 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 7, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623073/ 
xangacomplaint_image.pdf. 
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dren.148  For example, Amazon.com’s privacy policy states that “Ama-
zon.com does not sell products for purchase by children.  We sell 
children’s products for purchase by adults.  If you are under 18, you 
may use Amazon.com only with the involvement of a parent or guard-
ian.”149  Similarly, Target’s online privacy policy states that “[w]e do 
not knowingly collect personally identifiable information from chil-
dren under the age of 13.”150
Thus, corporations have responded to the Act by either: (1) not 
providing online services to children; (2) providing online services to 
children while ignoring the most meaningful yet burdensome 
COPPA requirements; (3) obtaining “proof” that a person is at least 
thirteen by merely having the person click a box before proceeding 
into the site; or (4) simply stating in boilerplate language that they 
don’t provide services to children or collect information from chil-
dren. 
By these methods, corporations intentionally bypass the Act.  
The first action—actually not providing services to persons under the 
age of 13—is a form of benign bypassing.  However, the other three 
actions represent something more than rogue corporate behavior; all 
three examples are a form of corporate governance in the field of in-
formation privacy. 
As in the case of privacy policies under the GLB Act, corpora-
tions’ reaction to COPPA has an effect on the market that resembles 
the effect of governmental authority.  The manner in which COPPA 
actually governs children’s online activity is dictated by corporations.  
Corporations “perform the role of authorship”151 by “perform[ing] as, 
and . . . [being] recognized as legitimate by some larger public . . . as 
authors of policies, of practices, of rules, and of norms”152 in the 
realm of online companies’ privacy practices toward children. 
Corporations set the governing standards of COPPA by inten-
tionally bypassing COPPA.  The Act is treated by corporations as 
binding only inasmuch as corporate norms define the actual practices 
of governing children’s online privacy.  In this domain, corpora-
 148 Joseph Turow, Privacy Policies on Children’s Websites: Do They Play by the Rules?, at 
12, March 2001, available at http://www.asc.upenn.edu/usr/jturow/PrivacyRe-
port.pdf#search=%22privacy%20policies%20on%20childrens'%20websites%22. 
 149 Amazon.com Online Privacy Policy, http://www.amazon.com/exec/ 
obidos/tg/browse/-/468496/104-9748931-2945530#children (last visited Sept. 11, 
2006). 
 150 Target.com Online Privacy Policy, http://sites.target.com/site/en/ 
spot/page.jsp?title=privacy_policy (last visited September 11, 2006). 
 151 Hall & Biersteker, supra note 120, at 4. 
 152 Id. 
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tions—not the government—have “set agendas [and] establish 
boundaries or limits for action.”153  In such cases, corporations should 
be “understood as power sources, as part of our governance system 
rather than objects of it . . . .”154
Unlike the GLB Act, COPPA represents a type of legislation that 
can be bypassed by mere words rather than conduct.  In other words, 
COPPA is an Act that can be circumvented merely by, in effect, stat-
ing “This law does not apply to us” or “By using this website (or click-
ing an I Agree button), you affirm that you are not a child and thus 
we are legally protected.”  The FTC’s own COPPA Rule encourages 
this behavior; it states that COPPA “applies to operators of commer-
cial Web sites and online services directed to children under the age 
of 13 that collect personal information.”155  For sites such as Ama-
zon.com or Google’s Gmail, the FTC created a loophole, stating that 
COPPA 
applies to general audience Web sites and online services that 
have actual knowledge that they are collecting information from 
children under the age of 13.  The [COPPA] Rule requires that 
these Web site operators post privacy policies, provide parental 
notice, and get verifiable consent from a parent or guardian be-
fore collecting personal information from children. 
     Although the [COPPA] Rule doesn’t define the term “actual 
knowledge,” it indicates that a Web site operator is considered to 
have actual knowledge of a user’s age if the site asks for—and re-
ceives—information from the user from which age can be deter-
mined.  For example, actual knowledge of age exists when an op-
erator learns a child’s age by asking for date of birth on a Web 
site’s registration page.156
This “actual knowledge” test is merely a designed loophole.  This 
loophole is unsurprising given the key role major corporations had in 
the passage and language of COPPA,157 which allows most sites to 
 153 Id. 
 154 Greenwood, supra note 77, at 44. 
 155 Federal Trade Commission, The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule: Not Just 
for Kids’ Sites, at 1, February, 2004, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/ 
pubs/alerts/coppabizalrt.pdf. 
 156 Id. 
 157 See, e.g., Consumer Internet Privacy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & 
Transp., 106th Cong., 2000 WL 1534362 (F.D.C.H.) (2000) (testimony of George 
Vradenburg, America Online Senior Vice President for Global and Strategic Plan-
ning) (stating that “[w]e [at AOL] worked closely with Senator Bryan, Chairman 
McCain, the FTC, and key industry and public interest groups to help pass and im-
plement the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act. . . .”). 
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claim compliance because they don’t ask for or receive information 
by which age can be determined. 
The net effect of this corporate reaction to COPPA is that chil-
dren’s personal information is, for the most part, just as unprotected 
and subject to disclosure to corporations as it was before COPPA was 
enacted.  In short, corporations’ reaction to the law has defined and 
set the parameters of COPPA. 
Moreover, corporations’ authority in this area is largely unchal-
lenged.  Corporations’ reactions to the Act have not been sanctioned 
vigilantly by enforcement actions and crippling penalties.  Quite to 
the contrary, outside of a few COPPA enforcement actions158  brought 
by the FTC, the standard and the governing legal regime is that 
COPPA is merely a harmless piece of legislation that can be com-
pletely ignored by utilizing boilerplate language that claims a lack of 
culpability.  Indeed, “[w]hether the state actors and corporate actors 
are sitting in a room negotiating or dealing through a more informal 
dance of reciprocal signaling and expectations, it would seem odd to 
treat the regulatory result as anything other than a joint product.”159
C. Intentional Violation of Privacy Legislation 
As noted supra, “corporations may choose to act in ways that 
openly and egregiously violate the legislative mandate because gov-
ernmental deterrence is weak and ineffective.”160  More specifically, 
when penalties for violating legal rules are unsubstantial, corpora-
tions are very much incentivized to openly engage in illegal action. 
The FTC is charged with enforcement of federal privacy law.  Yet 
FTC enforcement actions are few and far between, lack effectiveness, 
and serve little deterrent effect.  Because of this, corporations have 
simply chosen to intentionally violate certain privacy statutes because 
the benefits of doing so far outweigh the potential downside; in other 
words, intentional violation of legislation is beneficial because en-
forcement mechanisms are so weak.161  These intentional violations of 
privacy laws have engendered a society in which privacy protections 
are minimal and personal information is aggregated, disseminated, 
 158 The FTC’s website lists merely eleven enforcement cases under the Children’s 
Online Privacy Protection Act.  See Federal Trade Commission, Children’s Privacy, 
http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/childrens_enf.html (last visited Sept. 
11, 2006). 
 159 Danielsen, supra note 94, at 414. 
 160 See supra Part II.B. 
 161 SOLOVE, supra note15, at 72. 
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and analyzed with impunity.162  In short, corporations’ intentional vio-
lation of governmental law is yet another example of corporate gov-
ernance of information privacy inasmuch as this behavior has an ef-
fect on the marketplace similar to governmental regulation and 
inasmuch as this behavior goes largely unchallenged and is accepted 
as the social norm.163
Specifically, this behavior has gone largely unchallenged by ei-
ther the public or, more significantly, by the FTC.  For example, FTC 
enforcement actions are sporadic.  In the area of credit reporting, for 
instance, the FTC’s website lists a mere five enforcement actions since 
1998.164  The FTC has been most aggressive in pursuing companies 
for unfair and deceptive trade practices in their privacy practices and 
policies; the FTC’s position is “that the use or dissemination of per-
sonal information in a manner contrary to a posted privacy policy is a 
deceptive practice under the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.”165  A sum total 
of eighteen enforcement actions have been brought in this area un-
der the FTC’s enforcement authority under Section Five of the FTC 
Act.166
Furthermore, FTC enforcement actions tend to focus on heavy-
weight companies that bring in headlines and settlements for the 
government.  Thus, for example, in its few enforcement actions, the 
FTC has gone after companies such as GeoCities, Equifax, Experian, 
Hershey Foods, Mrs. Field’s, and Quicken Loans.167  The totality of 
the FTC’s weak enforcement activities reflects an overriding lack of 
adequate enforcement mechanisms in the area of individual informa-
tion privacy.  Therefore, the majority of companies who engage in 
 162 See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other 
Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Information for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595 (2004). 
 163  
Regulatory law is particularly susceptible to corporate influence.  Writ-
ing in the nineteenth century, Karl Marx cautioned that the concentra-
tion of wealth in corporate hands would subjugate the law to private 
control.  Writing in the early 1960s, Chicago-school free market 
economists reached the same conclusion, developing what has come to 
be called the “capture theory” of regulation. 
Ostas, supra note 110, at 269. 
 164 Federal Trade Commission, Credit Reporting, http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/ 
privacyinitiatives/credit_enf.html (last visited September 3, 2006). 
 165 SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 24, at 541. 
 166 See Federal Trade Commission, Unfairness & Deception, http://www.ftc.gov/ 
privacy/privacyinitiatives/promises_enf.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2006). 
 167 See generally, Federal Trade Commission, http://www.ftc.gov (last visited Mar. 4, 
2006). 
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privacy violations suffers no negative consequences and is aware that 
there is virtually no chance of being punished. 
Finally, FTC privacy enforcement actions generally result in little 
more than a symbolic penalty.168  Rather than engaging in adjudica-
tive proceedings, the FTC generally signs settlement agreements with 
companies.  Moreover, these settlements represent a mere pittance in 
comparison to the corporation’s coffers.  For example, in an early 
2006 enforcement action that made national headlines, ChoicePoint 
was fined fifteen million dollars by the FTC for a leak of private data.  
Notably, the fine was lauded as the largest fine ever imposed on a 
company by the FTC for violating a privacy law: “[t]he agency de-
clared that the company falsely assured the public about security pre-
cautions while handling personal data carelessly.”169  The agency ar-
gued that “the firm sold information to a purported business 
customer whose own ChoicePoint file identified a link to possible 
fraud.”170  But fifteen million dollars is small change for ChoicePoint; 
ChoicePoint currently has a market capitalization of $3.9 billion and 
annual revenues of approximately $1.1 billion.171  Indeed, for  
ChoicePoint—a company that specializes in data collection, sharing, 
and profiling—the fine is likely seen merely as the cost of doing busi-
ness. 
This toothless enforcement is typical of government enforce-
ment efforts more generally.  A 2006 Associated Press examination 
revealed that most financial penalties imposed by government agen-
cies remain uncollected: 
In many high-profile cases, fines are touted by authorities as proof 
that they are cracking down.  Yet frequently those orders are qui-
etly negotiated to just a fraction of their original amounts—as if 
drivers, faced with fines for speeding, offered the traffic court 
judge pennies on the dollar, and the judge agreed. 172
Worse, government agencies regularly issue fines that even they 
do not expect to collect.  For example, the Department of Energy 
 168 See Martha Mendoza & Christopher Sullivan, Amount of Unpaid Federal Fines 
Soars, THE STATE, Mar. 19, 2006, at A15. 
 169 Joseph Menn, ChoicePoint Is Fined for Data Breach; It Will Pay $10 Million for 
What the FTC Says Was Careless Handling of Consumer Information, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 27, 2006, at C1. 
 170 Id. 
 171 ChoicePoint Press Release, ChoicePoint Revenues Exceed $1 Billion in 2005, Jan. 
26, 2006, available at http://www.choicepoint.com/choicepoint/news.nsf/ 
df5fe1c5a497dce38525687e006037f9/2a89e7d31152d32085257101007f8821?OpenD
ocument. 
 172 Mendoza & Sullivan, supra note 168. 
PEEK FINAL.DOC 10/20/2006  11:32:11 AM 
158 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:127 
 
regularly issues fines—and coinciding press releases—for penalties 
that they are not even allowed to collect under federal law.173  The As-
sociated Press’s conclusion: 
     The reason [the Department of Energy] issued fines it could 
not collect was to show what the problems were and how bad . . . .  
A $1 million fine says something different than a $10,000 fine. 
     Financial penalties are regularly touted by agencies and prose-
cutors as a strict consequence of lawbreaking.  The message—that 
violators can expect to pay dearly—can be misleading.174
In another example in the information privacy realm, in a recent 
action against Gateway Learning Corporation,175 the FTC charged 
that “after collecting consumers’ information, Gateway Learning 
changed its privacy policy to allow it to share the information with 
third parties without notifying consumers or getting their consent.”176  
The settlement in this case was characteristically toothless: “The pro-
posed settlement bars Gateway Learning from making deceptive 
claims about how it will use consumers’ information and from apply-
ing material changes in its privacy policy retroactively, without con-
sumers’ consent.  It also requires that the company give up $4600 it 
earned from renting the data.”177
This is just one of many examples in which the settlement 
amounts are grossly disproportionate to the benefit that the company 
 173  
Federal law exempts the national nuclear laboratories from most fi-
nancial liability, but the Energy Department has issued some $2.5 mil-
lion in fines against Los Alamos, Livermore and Argonne national 
laboratories since 2000.  The fines—issued and waived in the same sen-
tence—involved 31 different workers who inhaled or touched radioac-
tive or toxic materials. 
     In 2004, Energy’s National Nuclear Safety Department fined Los 
Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico $770,000 for five separate 
violations after two workers were exposed to dangerously high levels of 
plutonium.  The violation notices add in parentheses: ”Waived by Stat-
ute.” 
     ”This is kind of an exercise in absurdity,” said Greg Mello, who 
heads the Los Alamos Study Group. . . . 
     Even so, the Energy Department includes the fines in its annual re-
ports to Congress and often announces them in press releases. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 174 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 175 Gateway Learning is the company that markets the “Hooked on Phonics” line 
of products.  See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Gateway Learning Settles 
FTC Privacy Charges, July 7, 2004) available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/ 
07/gateway.htm. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. (emphasis added). 
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at issue received from its use of consumers’ personal information 
and/or to the harm that the consumers at issue suffered.  In addi-
tion, such small settlement amounts provide no deterrent value.  The 
paradox here is that the FTC’s enforcement practices result in little 
privacy protection for consumers; the “bad acts” of small companies 
fall under the radar and, therefore, the vast majority of companies 
can do as they please in regard to privacy. 
Thus, large corporate offenders who are most likely to attract 
the attention of the FTC are not deterred by FTC enforcement ac-
tions because even the worst-case scenario—an enforcement action—
does not even amount to a thorn in the side of such large entities.  
This reflects a more general pattern in regard to government fines: 
The amount of unpaid federal fines has risen sharply in the last 
decade.  Individuals and corporations regularly avoid large, highly 
publicized penalties for wrongdoing—sometimes through nego-
tiations, sometimes because companies go bankrupt, sometimes 
due to officials’ failure to keep close track of who owes what un-
der a decentralized collection system.178
Moreover, these large corporations are the very entities that 
drive privacy legislation and governmental policy.179  In sum, “[i]t is 
 . . . clear that the FTC is a paper tiger.  A big company with an army 
of lawyers knows that it can get away with anything, and any FTC ac-
tion won’t hurt in the end.”180
Corporations therefore thwart federal privacy legislation by in-
tentionally violating the laws.  This corporate behavior affects the 
market in ways similar to a governmental law.  In the vacuum of 
strong privacy enforcement, corporations shape a regime in which 
the federal privacy laws are virtually meaningless, and corporations’ 
 178 Mendoza & Sullivan, supra note 168. 
 179 In another enforcement action outside of the privacy realm, the FTC garnered 
headlines but little more when it went after Experian for unfair or deceptive trade 
practices.  The FTC’s charge was that “Experian deceptively marketed free credit re-
ports by not adequately disclosing that consumers would automatically be signed up 
for a credit report monitoring service costing $79.95 if they didn’t cancel within 30 
days.”  Robert Gellman, FTC Falls Short, Again, DM NEWS, Nov. 11, 2005, available at 
http://dmnews.com/cgi-bin/artprevbot.cgi?article_id=34715&dest=article. 
Experian reportedly had 9 million customers paying $80 a year.  That’s 
$720 million in revenue.  Since some of those customers paid for more 
than one year of service and many are continuing customers, the total 
revenue probably exceeds $1 billion. . . . What’s the consequence of 
violating the law?  A fine of less than $1 million, plus refunds. . . . 
[L]et’s say that the fine and refunds total $25 million.  That is a pit-
tance relative to the revenue. 
Id. 
 180 Gellman, supra note 179. 
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actions have an effect on the market that resembles the effect of gov-
ernmental authority.  As Paul Schiff Berman has observed, “law is al-
most never ‘delivered’ on the ground in the pure form that treaties, 
legislation, or constitutional court decisions would indicate.  Thus, . . 
. scholars are in danger of missing how norms actually operate if they 
over-emphasize the grand statements made at the highest levels of 
government.”181  The actual legal regime is one in which corporations 
possess virtually full license to engage in their chosen anti-privacy 
practices.  Rather than complying with government’s law, corpora-
tions view privacy violations as the norm and any (unlikely) penalty 
that may result as merely the cost of doing business. 
Finally, as in the first two examples, corporations’ private author-
ity vis-à-vis the FTC has been unchallenged in any meaningful way.  
Thus, this corporate behavior has become the accepted social norm. 
PART IV 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PARADIGM 
Actions, reactions, and inactions by all players in the system must be taken 
into account to get an accurate picture of the regime itself. Under such cir-
cumstances, if the decisions of corporate actors are indistinguishable from 
the decisions of state actors in terms of regulatory and social welfare effects, 
then treating one as “private activity” and the other as “regulatory” or 
“governance” activity will likely lead to more than ideological confusion. 
Such counterfactual characterizations may well result in . . . mistakes in 
policymaking.182
This Article began by arguing that information privacy jurispru-
dence is at an impasse and went on to describe the ossified state of 
domestic information privacy law.  The Article then proffered that 
our information privacy quandaries have not and cannot be solved by 
working solely within the current jurisprudential paradigm.  In other 
words, our paradigm must take account of the reality that informa-
tion privacy is not just about governmental laws and enforcement, but 
is also very much about corporate power and corporate governance. 
Problems of information privacy cannot be solved unless their 
foundations and root causes are exposed and explored, including 
symbiotic governance by corporations and governmental entities.  As 
Claire Cutler argues, “that which goes unrecognized is difficult to 
regulate.”183
 181 Berman, supra note 105, at 498. 
 182 Danielsen, supra note 94, at 415. 
 183 Cutler, supra note 1, at 24.  Similarly, James Nehf correctly argues that: 
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How does such an understanding alter our approaches to infor-
mation privacy law?  How can we utilize this new understanding?  I 
offer preliminary thoughts that represent but the beginnings of the 
possible understanding of the multiple implications of this new para-
digm. 
A. Beyond Market-Based and Self-Help Solutions 
The recognition that corporations govern information privacy 
law and policy represents a new paradigm.  This paradigm is a shift 
from the traditional notion that information privacy law is merely the 
province of the government.  This new paradigm is also a move away 
from the limited notion that solutions must focus on one of two 
forces: governmental law or the market.  Rather, there is a third, 
powerful force that has heretofore gone unrecognized in the litera-
ture: governance by corporations.  Folding this third force into the 
conceptual model of the dynamics of information privacy law and 
policy mandates a rethinking of possible and practical solutions.184
Significantly, this recognition weakens the argument that the 
market should provide the proper compass for determining whether 
information privacy practices are sound.185  Market dynamics and in-
dustry self-regulation186 cannot be relied upon as correct barometers 
of public opinion or correct action when the market itself is domi-
nated by the very actors that shape the law and govern the industry 
practices. 
Arguments for approaching problems of information privacy 
with market-based solutions reflect the belief that informational pri-
     Since there are benefits and risks associated with information collec-
tion and data sharing, policy makers must attempt to strike a balance. 
In doing so, they must first define the problem.  This is a critical step in 
the formulation of public policy because the way in which a problem is 
defined on the public agenda will affect its ultimate resolution. 
Nehf, supra note 2, at 5. 
 184 Thus, for example, the importance of focusing on strengthening the lackluster 
enforcement efforts of the FTC pales when armed with the knowledge that FTC en-
forcement is but a piece of the puzzle. 
 185 “[G]overnment actors insist that self-regulation is the American way, and 
[that] it is enough.”  Litman, supra note 12, at 1287. 
 186  
Perhaps the most direct corporate influence on legal norms arises in 
the area of self-regulation.  Advertising law provides an illustration.  
The Federal Trade Commission is officially charged with regulating 
false advertising, yet most advertising disputes are subject to industry 
self-regulation.  It is largely left to the industry itself to set its own stan-
dards. 
Ostas, supra note 110, at 271. 
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vacy is merely a personal concern.  As James Nehf has observed, in-
formation privacy has traditionally been viewed as “an individual con-
cern rather than a general societal value or a public interest prob-
lem.”187  Specifically, he argues that188 “[t]his [definition of 
information privacy as an individual concern] has influenced the re-
sulting public policy solutions, yet it may not be the most effective way 
to approach modern privacy concerns.”189  Thus, solutions have 
tended toward individual, private, and market-based solutions.190  “In 
contrast, when a problem is viewed as a general societal concern, and 
a resolution in the public interest is sought, enforcement of the legal 
norm is primarily through government agency oversight and regula-
tion.”191
Our understanding of privacy as a private concern rather than a 
public concern must shift once we acknowledge that corporate gov-
ernance is a force which needs to be held in check by the govern-
ment.  In this respect, information privacy can be seen for what it is: a 
public value on the most fundamental level.  “If no change [in the 
political and legal rhetoric] occurs, we can expect to see more laws 
enacted periodically that purport to address privacy concerns in par-
ticular sectors, but individuals will still be expected to shoulder the 
burden of monitoring their own information, and market-based solu-
tions will predominate.”192
This view of information privacy as a personal problem rather 
than a public one is merely a social understanding that has engen-
dered parallel social norms.  Those entities that have a vested interest 
in propagating a theory of information privacy as individual and pri-
 187 Nehf, supra note 2, at 5. 
 188 James Nehf explains the underpinnings of the viewpoint that privacy is an in-
dividual issue rather than a larger social issue: 
Protecting information privacy threatened defined and influential stake-
holders—government agencies, employers, marketing firms, law en-
forcement—all of whom were just beginning to see the advantages of 
information technologies.  All had an interest in collecting and sharing 
as much information as possible.  Each of these stakeholders thus had 
incentives to redefine the issue from the ideal of privacy as a founda-
tional societal value to some lesser ideal that required the balancing of 
other societal concerns—efficiency, productivity, crime control, etc.—
against the individual harms that might be caused by data collection 
and sharing. 
Nehf, supra note 2, at 47 (emphasis added). 
 189 Id. at 5. 
 190 See id. 
 191 Id. at 5. 
 192 Id. at 91. 
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vate rather than public also have an interest in molding this theory 
into a widespread social norm. 
If information privacy is instead viewed as a public value, and the 
symbiotic relationship between public governance and private gov-
ernance is acknowledged, then practical solutions to problems of in-
formation privacy begin to emerge.  If government and corporate ac-
tors work in symbiotic relationships to form the legal regime under 
which we live, then reform efforts must focus on all of the actors that 
are the primary power centers shaping the reigning legal regime of 
privacy. 
In short, understanding that corporations govern the informa-
tion privacy regime is of profound importance because the privacy of 
personal information is not “just another consumer issue,” nor is it 
one that ought to be solved by the individual or the market. 
B. Corporate Governance and the Fallacy of Choice 
Privacy scholars have noted that the concept that consumers 
have a “choice” about privacy is misguided193 because if there is any 
choice, it is a Hobson’s choice: “an apparently free choice when there 
is no real alternative; the necessity of accepting one of two or more 
equally objectionable alternatives.”194  This point is even more salient 
once the private governance paradigm is conceded.  In regard to per-
sonal “choice” in information privacy:195
 193 Moreover, on the consumer front, this privacy problem presents the ubiqui-
tous problem of lack of choice.  As Julie Cohen argues, 
the rhetoric of “choice” obfuscates the political choice that current 
data privacy policy represents.  The data privacy debate is not merely, 
or even mostly, about the satisfaction of consumer preferences as ex-
pressed in the direct market for goods and services.  Like the rhetoric 
of “transaction costs,” the emphasis on “choice” conceals the degree to 
which the model predetermines who chooses.  In particular, with re-
spect to secondary uses of personally-identified data, the “choice” that 
the model protects is not choice by individuals.  It is the choice of data 
processors about how to classify individuals, and for what purposes. 
Cohen, supra note 40, at 1399. 
 194 M-W.com dictionary definition, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/hobson’s 
(last visited September 7, 2006). 
 195  
Consumers are faced with the Hobson’s choice of surrendering their 
private information, being unable to participate in large segments of 
the commercial economy or to lie. 
     Now, there are three ways of approaching this problem.  First, one 
may stridently protest and walk out the door.  Second, one may ap-
proach the sales clerk and decline to provide the information risking 
delay or that the transaction will not occur.  Third, one could tell a 
white-lie. . . . 
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legal consciousness regarding contracts is likely to contain much 
of the same multivocality that characterizes legal consciousness on 
other kindred topics.  When, in order to purchase a needed 
product, the consumer must accept the retailer’s standard-form 
contract, the symbolism may evoke hierarchy and oppression 
more than it evokes mutualism, voluntarism, or equality.  Or, 
more likely, it may evoke both at once, leaving the consumer with 
a Hobson’s choice between a narrative of disempowerment (“I 
had no say in the matter”) and a narrative of self-blame (“I 
brought it on myself”).196
In other words, consumers can either consent to a company’s 
privacy policy or not do business with that particular company at all; 
either action represents consumer powerlessness.197  In fact, privacy 
policies among industries are generally significantly similar—hence, 
the realistic “choice” of the consumer is often to consent to a privacy 
policy or not do business with an entire industry at all.  This Hobson’s 
choice, in fact, amounts to coercion.  We cannot live in the modern 
world and refrain from consenting to the ubiquitous, company-biased 
privacy policies and stances.  As Paul Schwartz has noted, this is an 
“autonomy trap.”198
True contractual consent requires meaningful choice.  For ex-
ample, there often exists no meaningful choice on the part of the 
shopping consumer, as the marketplace is filled with industry leaders 
who have a firm stranglehold on the industry and who have adopted 
virtually the same pro-business privacy policies.  Thus, the American 
world of contracts is one in which consent is meaningless and 
“agreements” are but a farce.  When corporate actors shape the rules 
(in confluence with the government) in such a way that the rules not 
only heavily favor those corporate actors but also leave consumers 
with an extremely limited set of choices, the notion that individuals 
truly “consent” to corporate privacy practices becomes farcical. 
The phrase “knowledge is power” is almost a truism, as is the 
claim that power resides in the hands of those who control the in-
formation.  But this truism has real meaning in our twenty-first cen-
Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, It’s Nobody’s Business, But You Still Cannot Lie About It: 
Criminalizing Innocent Attempts to Maintain Cyber-Privacy, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 377, 378 
(2004). 
 196 Mark Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 91, 112 n.27 
(2003). 
 197 Larry Magid, It Pays to Read License Agreements, http://www.pcpitstop.com/ 
spycheck/eula.asp (last visited Sept. 8, 2006) (discussing lack of choice in end-user 
license agreements). 
 198 Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 825 
(2000). 
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tury society.  Understood at its base level, consumers’ “free will” is at 
the behest of corporate decision-making.  In short, the ceding of our 
personal information to corporations has engendered a society that is 
controlled by corporations.  This realization is of profound signifi-
cance because we cannot solve the problems of domestic information 
privacy unless we address this underlying power dynamic. 
Moreover, corporate governance has an effect on social norms.  
When corporate governance is part of the legal regime, consumer 
apathy199 regarding their lack of information privacy becomes less 
surprising.  Outside of the problem of identity theft, the vast majority 
of consumers seem disinterested in privacy violations.  Even more se-
riously, as discussed supra, many legal scholars treat the problem as 
one that merits attention but is obviously less “important” than mat-
ters of human rights or environmental law.  This phenomenon is not 
insignificant.  When both laypersons and legal scholars dismiss a so-
cial problem as trivial or, at the most, important but less deserving of 
attention than “real” social justice issues, that problem becomes rele-
gated to the backwaters of social and legal thought.  In turn, the so-
cial problem is virtually ignored by policymakers and the govern-
ment.  Yet consumer attitudes are shaped and guided not only by the 
government and the mass media, but also by private actors such as 
corporations via shared governance of information privacy law. 
C. Bringing the Individual Back into Information Privacy 
The stripping away of political façade, legitimization, and hid-
den sources of power is necessary to bring individual citizens’ con-
cerns to the forefront.  While it may be true that we are living in a 
time of rapid transition from governmental authority to symbiotic 
governance both domestically and globally, this does not force the 
 199 One commentator has observed that: 
[C]onsumers are not as concerned about financial privacy as surveys 
suggest.  A June 2001 study found that many survey questions “distort 
or manipulate” the answers.  The study went on to note that surveys 
“cannot effectively replicate the choices that consumers make in the 
real world, where they must choose among competing desires and 
where nothing comes for free.”  The authors of the survey also point 
out that consumers are continuing to shop online in record numbers 
despite early forecasts that privacy concerns would keep them away.  
The study notes that other surveys show that when people are asked to 
name their top concerns without being given a list of possible re-
sponses, privacy is not listed as one of their top concerns.  The authors 
of the study also indicate that consumers may not always report their 
actual behavior accurately. 
Eric Poggemiller, Note, The Consumer Response to Privacy Provisions in Gramm-Leach-
Bliley: Much Ado About Nothing?, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 617, 633–34 (2002). 
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conclusion that individuals must simply accept this fact and consent 
to being governed by private actors without democratic accountabil-
ity. 
Rather, the recognition that private governance is occurring in 
the field of information privacy is a powerful one that can unlock a 
vault of realistic solutions to seemingly intractable problems. 
For instance, the understanding that the illusion of “choice” in 
privacy negotiations is merely a Hobson’s choice constructed by gov-
erning corporations undermines arguments for industry self-
regulation and menu-based privacy options between consumers and 
corporations.  Such “true” contractual arrangements are unlikely to 
exist between powerful corporations that govern consumer “privacy” 
contracts and relatively powerless consumers. 
Similarly, calls for robust privacy legislation appear quixotic 
when viewed through the lens of corporate governance of informa-
tion privacy.  This is also true of arguments for more robust and fre-
quent FTC enforcement actions because the state is complicit—
whether through action or inaction—in governance by corporations.  
Indeed, “in its manifestation as market authority, private authority 
transforms both the state and state sovereignty.  However, the state 
participates in this transformation.”200  Once we understand and ac-
cept that information privacy is governed not just by our federal, 
state, and local governments, but also by corporations, our legal and 
policy strategies should be rethought. 
Clearly, the “enforcement” model of protecting information pri-
vacy is woefully inadequate.  The FTC should be understood as 
merely a weak enforcement mechanism that ultimately operates in 
the interest of corporations.  As argued supra, with few exceptions, 
even the few FTC settlement actions that are brought to closure do 
not involve the individuals whose privacy has been violated, nor do 
the individuals share in the spoils of the settlement funds. 
Individuals must be brought back into the privacy picture.201  
Looking to the market or to governmental agencies to enforce pri-
 200 Thomas J. Biersteker & Rodney Bruce Hall, Private Authority as Global Govern-
ance, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 203, 209 
(Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002). 
 201 One commentator argues that: 
the federal courts, and the Supreme Court in particular, have bestowed 
the equivalent of human rights on these artificial entities.  They now 
have the protection of law and the Constitution, which means the pro-
tection of the police and the military, to interfere in our elections and 
in our lawmaking. . . .  They’re able to field fifty or a thousand lobby-
ists. . . .  What’s happened is, we’ve been channeled into regulatory 
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vacy rights is a largely futile effort likely to produce few victories.  The 
privacy problem is fundamentally one wherein the players are corpo-
rations and government, and individuals are distant spectators 
equipped with foggy, distorting binoculars. 
Significantly, this lockout of consumers from their own informa-
tion privacy matters202 has been accomplished via a steering of such 
matters away from the judicial system and into legislative and regula-
tory backwaters.  A pessimist might argue that calls for common law 
remedies to privacy wrongs—based in tort, property, and contract 
law—are unlikely to succeed when the status quo is governed by the 
very entities that have a stake in minimizing our personal information 
privacy.  But the jurisprudential glass is actually half full.  Exposing 
the underlying power structures that dictate privacy practices and 
leave the individual out of the equation almost entirely might well 
cause a rethinking of possible common law solutions. 
For example, many privacy wrongs arise out of the farce of pri-
vacy policies.  Consumers “agree” to what are, in fact, anti-privacy 
policies, and are forced to live with that “agreement” because they 
consented.  Yet once it is understood that there is no true “choice” or 
“consent” taking place on the part of the consumer due to corporate 
power and governance by corporations, the underutilized defense 
that such “agreements” are in fact unconscionable becomes a mean-
ingful possibility.  The seminal unconscionability case of Williams v. 
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.203 was decided in a context of one retailer 
wielding significant power over a neighborhood of consumers with 
few options.  Yet Williams v. Walker Furniture Co. could serve as the 
small-scale model for a more sophisticated case against corporations 
and forced privacy agreements on a wide-scale basis.  Douglas Baird 
administrative agencies, like the Federal Communications Commission, 
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Securities Exchange Com-
mission and the National Labor Relations Board, where we try to make 
the best of the worst of a bad situation. . . . 
David Barsamian, Challenging Corporate Power: An Interview with Richard Grossman, Z 
MAG., Jan. 2000, available at http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Corporations/ 
ChallengingCorpPower.html. 
 202 For example, consumers generally receive no part of any FTC monetary set-
tlement.  In the few cases in which they have received some redress, it has been paltry 
at best and grossly disproportionate to the harm consumers may have suffered be-
cause of the privacy violation.  As one commentator has noted, “[t]oo often, the 
FTC’s principal interest is in being able to pat itself on the back through a trophy 
press release.  The commission rarely seeks to obtain recovery for consumers.”  
Gellman, supra note 179. 
 203 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
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argues that such boilerplate agreements between companies and con-
sumers often reflect a deeper, profound social problem: 
When boilerplate appears troublesome, some other mischief is of-
ten afoot.  Boilerplate, while not a vice itself, is frequently the 
symptom of a problem that the law should appropriately address  
. . . . [T]roublesome boilerplate can emerge from anticompetitive 
behavior.  Legal intervention, however, must aim at the underly-
ing anticompetitive conduct itself, not the boilerplate.204
Although I do not agree with Baird’s assertion that boilerplate 
contracts should not be analyzed under the doctrine of adhesion, but 
rather under some underlying “bad actor” conduct, I do agree that 
boilerplate “privacy” agreements reflect an underlying power imbal-
ance that is troublesome and should be accounted for when deciding 
the legal validity of a contract. 
On the property front, some proponents of individuals’ informa-
tional privacy have argued that personal information should be 
deemed as property of the individual.  This argument has, to date, 
been unsuccessful.  Yet judicial attitudes toward information privacy 
might be swayed if the information privacy problem were understood 
as one engendered by the power imbalance between corporations 
and individuals.  In other words, if corporations govern information 
privacy and individuals’ personal data is considered to be public, the 
question of the role of power and powerlessness in property struggles 
comes into play.  As K.J. Greene notes: 
When we think of private property, we think of three characteris-
tics: the right to exclude others, title (ownership), and the right 
to collect income or rent off the property . . . .  It has been noted 
that: intellectual property law can ameliorate but not eliminate 
underlying disparities in bargaining power [and accordingly] 
economic need might induce [a person] to part with control over 
her [private property], and even give up liberty to use it, perhaps 
in return for fairly small rewards.205
Thus, the dismissal of the “personal information as property” ar-
gument is significantly weakened when confronted with the reality of 
appropriation of personal property by the dominant entities that 
govern the information privacy landscape. 
These two examples represent possible means of reviving com-
mon law theories by exposing the underlying power structures at 
work in information privacy law and enforcement.  The notion of 
 204 Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933, 934 (2006). 
 205 K.J. Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music: A Legacy of Unequal Protection, 21 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 339, 375–76 (1999). 
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governance by corporations is one that can and should engender a 
myriad of imaginative resistance models—whether via the judiciary or 
other, less traditional mechanisms. 
CONCLUSION 
The democratic implications of corporate governance are pro-
found.  As one scholar notes: 
[A]s firms begin to function like governments, this raises major is-
sues for democratic and representative theories of governance  
. . . . [P]rivate entities are not normatively entitled to act authori-
tatively for the public, because they are not subject to mechanisms 
of political accountability, but rather are only subject to the ac-
countability of their private members.206
Although an examination of the implications for democracy 
posed by corporate governance is beyond the scope of this Article, it 
is crucial to begin to raise questions regarding democracy, account-
ability, and legitimacy in the realm of information privacy.  And the 
antecedent requirement of such questioning is to expose governance 
by corporations in this and other fields, for wrongs that are rooted in 
invisible systems of authority cannot be remedied. 
 
 206 Biersteker & Hall, supra note 200, at 211. 
